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Abstract
Suppose that three boys and three girls attend a party. Each boy and girl have a crush on exactly
one of the three girls and three boys, respectively. The following dilemma arises: On one hand,
each person thinks that if there is a mutual affection between a girl and boy, the couple should
go on a date the next day. On the other hand, everyone wants to avoid the possible embarrassing
situation in which their heart is broken “publicly.” In this paper, we solve the dilemma using novel
cards called triangle cards. The number of cards required is only six, which is minimal in the
case where each player commits their input at the beginning of the protocol. We also construct
multiplication and addition protocols based on triangle cards. Combining these protocols, we
can securely compute any function f : {0, 1, 2}n → {0, 1, 2}.
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1 Introduction
Three girls, Alice, Carol, and Ellen, and three boys, Bob, Dave, and Frank, are having a
good time at a party. Assume that each boy has a crush on exactly one of the three girls,
and each girl has a crush on exactly one of the three boys. On one hand, everyone thinks
that if there is a mutual affection between a girl and a boy the couple should go on a date
the next day. On the other hand, each of the six people is too shy to announce the person
they have in mind: Everyone wants to avoid the possible embarrassing situation in which
their heart is broken “publicly.” Are there any solutions to this dilemma?
A cryptographic technique called secure multiparty computation provides a viable solution.
This enables participants holding private inputs to securely compute the value of a desired
function, without revealing their input information. In order to solve the social dilemma
described above, it suffices to design a secure multiparty computation protocol for the
function f : {0, 1, 2}6 → {0, 1}9:
f(a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2) = (c0,0, c0,1, c0,2, c1,0, c1,1, c1,2, c2,0, c2,1, c2,2),
where ci,j = 1 if (ai = j) ∧ (bj = i) and ci,j = 0 otherwise. We call this function f the
(3, 3)-matching function, and refer to the problem of securely computing f as the secure
(3, 3)-matching problem. Because it is well-known in the field of cryptography that any
function can be securely computed [2], the secure (3, 3)-matching problem can clearly be
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resolved somehow. However, conventional secure multiparty computation protocols tend
to be based on a deep mathematical perspective, and hence it seems to be unlikely that
all participants executing a given protocol will concretely understand its correctness and
security. Because the secure (3, 3)-matching problem would typically arise in everyday life,
such as in the party scenario mentioned above, it is desirable to have a more simple and
convenient solution. Thus, this paper solicits a solution to the secure matching problem
using physical cards. The cards used in this paper are novel ones, called triangle cards, which
can easily be constructed using sheets of paper and seals.
1.1 Triangle card
In this paper, we propose a novel card called a triangle card, whose shape is a regular triangle,
where its front/back sides have the same symbol (e.g., ♠). We use the following encoding
rules:
4♠ ↔ 0, 4♠ ↔ 1, 4♠ ↔ 2 = −1.
In an execution of a protocol, both faces of a card can be hidden by placing seals as follows:
4© .
We will formally define triangle cards in Section 2.
1.2 Our results
In this paper, we design a protocol for solving the secure (3, 3)-matching problem using six
triangle cards. We also design a protocol for any function f : (F3)n → F3.
1.2.1 Secure (3, 3)-matching protocol
As shown in Table 1, we construct a protocol for the secure (3, 3)-matching problem using
six cards and six shuffles. Our protocol is efficient in terms of both the number of cards and
shuffles, because a straightforward solution based on the five-card trick [1] requires 42 cards
and 15 shuffles, as explained in Section 3. Our protocol is optimal in terms of the number of
cards when each party submits a (tuple of) card(s) as input at the beginning of a protocol,
because the number of parties in (3, 3)-matching is six.
1.2.2 Protocol for any function
As shown in Table 1, we design a multiplication protocol over F3 using four cards. Regular
3-sided cards, proposed by Shinagawa et al. [5], also enable a secure multiplication protocol
over F3, while requiring 15 cards. Although the previous work in [5] and ours are based on
different types of cards, and thus incomparable, this paper implies that triangle cards are
effective for computing a function over F3 compared with regular 3-sided cards. Based on
the previous addition protocol in [5], we also design an addition protocol for triangle cards.
Because our protocols output a card with seals, an output card for our protocol can be used
as an input card for another protocol, i.e., our protocols are composable. By combining our
protocols, we can securely compute any function over F3.
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Table 1 Comparison between our protocols and previous ones.
Type of cards Number of cards Number of shuffles
◦ Protocol for Secure (3, 3)-Matching Problem
Based on [1] ♣,♥ 42 15
Ours triangle 6 6
◦ Multiplication over F3
[5] regular 3-sided 15 2
Ours triangle 4 2
◦ Addition over F3
[5] regular 3-sided 2 1
Ours triangle 2 1
1.3 Related work
While most existing card-based protocols (cf. [1,4]) utilize a binary pair of cards ♣ ♥ , there
are some studies based on different types of cards, such as cards with rotationally symmetric
backs [3,7], polarizing cards [6], and regular n-sided polygon cards [5]. Part of our technique
is motivated by this previous works. In particular, we employ a rotation shuffle [3,5] and a
turning shuffle [6].
2 Triangle card
In this section, we define triangle cards and the operations used in our protocols.
2.1 Definition of triangle cards
A triangle card is a card of regular triangular shape, whose front and back sides show the






We use the following encoding rule:
4♠ ↔ 0, 4♠ ↔ 1, 4♠ ↔ 2 = −1.
The value of a card can be hidden from participating parties by placing seals on both sides,
as follows:
4♠ Put a seal−−−−−−→4© .
For a value a ∈ F3, we call a card of a without seals an opened card, denoted by bac , and a















We define operations for a single triangle card as follows:
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Consequently, a rotation by (n× 120)◦ transforms a card of value a into a card of value
a + n. We call this operation a rotation n-times.
Turn: A turn operation turns over a card. That is, it transforms a card of value a into a



























2.2 Shuffles for triangle cards
A shuffle is a probabilistic operation on a sequence of cards. In this paper, we use three
types of shuffle: rotation shuffle, turning shuffle, and flower shuffle. We present example
implementations of these shuffles in the appendix.
2.2.1 Rotation shuffle
This takes a sequence of n closed cards (dx1e , dx2e , · · · , dxne) and outputs a sequence of n
closed cards (dx1 + re , dx2 + re , · · · , dxn + re), where r is a uniformly random number over
F3 that is independent from the inputs and other randomness, and information-theoretically












· · · 4©
dxn+re
.
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2.2.2 Turning shuffle
This takes a sequence of n closed cards (dx1e , dx2e , · · · , dxne) and outputs a sequence of
n closed cards (d(−1)r · x1e , d(−1)r · x2e , · · · , d(−1)r · xne), where r is a uniformly ran-
dom number over {0, 1} that is independent from the inputs and other randomness, and
information-theoretically hidden from all parties. (See Figure 3 in the appendix.) We denote
















This takes a sequence of 3 + n closed cards (dx0e , dx1e , dx2e , dy1e , · · · , dyne) and outputs
a sequence of 3 + n closed cards (dxre , dxr+1e , dxr+2e , dy1 + re , · · · , dyn + re), where r is
a uniformly random number over F3 that is independent of the inputs and other randomness,
and information-theoretically hidden from all parties. (See Figure 4 in the appendix.) We




















· · · 4©
dyn+re
.
3 A solution based on existing methods
In this section, we briefly describe a straightforward solution for the secure (3, 3)-matching
problem using a deck of cards employed in previous studies, where their front sides show
♣ , ♥ and their back sides show the same ? . A pair of face-down cards is called a
commitment to 0 (resp. 1) if its face-up symbols are (♣,♥) (resp. (♥,♣)). The main
tool used is the five-card trick, proposed by den Boer [1], which takes two commitments to
a, b ∈ {0, 1} and a single additional card, and outputs the value c = a ∧ b with five free cards
as follows:
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
♥ → c, ♣ ♣ ♥ ♥ ♥ .
This requires a single shuffle called a random cut. Let Alice (resp. Bob) input 1 if she likes
Bob (resp. Alice), and 0 otherwise. This solves a secure matching problem between two
parties, where either both parties like each other or one party does not like the other. A
straightforward solution for the secure (3, 3)-matching problem is to apply the five-card trick
for every boy-girl pair. That is, each girl (indexed by i) submits a tuple of three commitments
to (ai,0, ai,1, ai,2) ∈ {0, 1}3, where ai,j = 1 if and only if she likes the j-th boy. Similarly, each
boy submits a tuple of three commitments in the same manner. Then, for every i, j ∈ F3 we
apply the five-card trick to the commitments to ai,j and bj,i. We set ci,j = 1 if the output
is 1, and 0 otherwise. (Recall that ci,j = 1 means that the i-th girl and j-th boy have a
mutual affection.) This idea solves the secure (3, 3)-matching problem using 36 + 1 cards
and 9 shuffles.
One weakness of the above idea is that each party may deviate from the input rule, i.e.,
each party may submit two or more commitments to 1. In order to prevent a deviation from
the input rule, we should check the input format in a zero-knowledge manner. Based on
the idea of Shinagawa et al. [5] (Section 5, a voting protocol), we can check the validity
FUN 2018
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v ∈ {true, false} of three commitments using additional six cards, without destroying the
input, as follows:
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
ai,0
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
ai,1
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
ai,2
♣ ♣ ♣ ♥ ♥ ♥ → v, ? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
ai,0
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
ai,1
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
ai,2
♣ ♣ ♣ ♥ ♥ ♥ .
This also requires a single shuffle. Thus, the number of cards required is 42 (= 36 + 6), and
the number of shuffles required is 15 (= 9 + 6).
4 Our main solution
In this section, we solve the (3, 3)-matching problem using six triangle cards. Recall that the
(3, 3)-matching function f : (F3)6 → {0, 1}9 is defined follows:
f(a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2) = (c0,0, c0,1, c0,2, c1,0, c1,1, c1,2, c2,0, c2,1, c2,2),
where ci,j = 1 if (ai = j) ∧ (bj = i) and ci,j = 0 otherwise.
We first design a protocol for checking x ?= 0 in Section 4.1. Then, we construct a
(3, 3)-matching protocol in Section 4.2.
4.1 IsZero protocol
The IsZero protocol takes two cards (dxe , b0c), and outputs a predicate c ∈ {0, 1} for x ?= 0
without changing the sequence or revealing information of x beyond the predicate c.
The protocol proceeds as follows.





















where r is a random value generated in the shuffle.
3. Open the left card. Let v = (−1)r · x be the opened value.
a. The case v = 0: Close the left card, open the right card, and rotate the right card 2
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4. Output c = 1 if v = 0 and c = 0 otherwise.
4.1.1 Correctness
First, let us check that the resulting sequence is equal to the original sequence (dxe , b0c).
When v = 0, it holds that x = 0. Thus, the resulting sequence (d0e , b0c) is equal to the
original sequence. When v = 1, it is either the case that (x, r) = (1, 0) or (x, r) = (2, 1).
Thus, the resulting sequence (d(−1)re , b0c) is equal to the original sequence. When v = 2,
either (x, r) = (2, 0) or (x, r) = (1, 1). Thus, the resulting sequence (d(−1)r+1e , b0c) is equal
to the original sequence. Moreover, we can observe that c is equal to the predicate for x ?= 0,
because v = 0 if and only if x = 0.
4.1.2 Security
When c = 1, i.e., x = 0, the opened value v is always 0. When c = 0, the opened value
v = 1 (or 2) with a probability of exactly 1/2. Thus, the distribution of v is statistically
independent from x given c.
4.2 Secure (3, 3)-matching protocol
The protocol proceeds as follows.









































where r0 is a random value generated in the shuffle. Note that the first three cards of
the resulting sequence are (a2−r0 , a1−r0 , a−r0), because those of the original sequence are
arranged in reverse order (a2, a1, a0).
3. Open the fourth card. Let v0 = b0 + r0 be the opened value. Now, the current sequence
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5. Apply the IsZero protocol to the third/fourth cards, and let c0 be the output of this.













































where r1 is a random value generated in the shuffle.
8. Open the fourth card. Let v1 = b1 − b0 + r1 be the opened value. Now, the current










9. Permute the first three cards according to (A) in Step 4 if v1 = 1 and (B) in Step 4 if
v1 = 2. Rotate the fourth/fifth cards (3− v1)-times, and rotate the third card 2-times.










10. Apply the IsZero protocol to the third/fourth cards, and let c1 be the output of this.





































where r2 is a random value generated in the shuffle.
13. Open the fourth card, and let v2 = b2 − b1 + r2 be the opened value. Now, the current








14. Permute the first three cards according to (A) in Step 4 if v2 = 1 and (B) in Step 4 if
v2 = 2. Rotate the fourth/fifth cards (3 − v2)-times, and rotate the third card 1-time.
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15. Apply the IsZero protocol to the third/fourth cards, and let c2 be the output of this.
16. For j = 0, 1, 2, do the following: If cj = 1, the (j + 3)-th input bj is publicly announced1
by the (j + 3)-th party, and we set cj,bj = 1 and ci,j = 0 for i 6= bj . Otherwise, set
(c0,j , c1,j , c2,j) = (0, 0, 0).
17. Output (c0,0, c0,1, c0,2, c1,0, c1,1, c1,2, c2,0, c2,1, c2,2).
4.2.1 Correctness
Let j ∈ {0, 1, 2} be any index. From the correctness of the IsZero protocol, the value ci,j
is 1 if it holds that both i = bj and −j + abj = 0, and 0 otherwise. That is, ci,j = 1 if
(ai = j) ∧ (bj = i), and ci,j = 0 otherwise. Therefore, the above protocol correctly computes
the (3, 3)-matching function.
4.2.2 Security
From the security of the IsZero protocol, the opened values of the IsZero protocol are
statistically independent from the inputs ab0 , ab1 , ab2 given the outputs c0, c1, c2. The opened
values v0 = b0 + r0, v1 = b1 + r1, v2 = b2 + r2 in Steps 3, 8, and 13, respectively, are masked
by a uniformly random number r0, r1, r2 ∈ F3. Thus, the distribution of the opened values
and the distribution of the inputs are statistically independent given an output value.
5 Secure computation for any function
In this section, we construct addition and multiplication protocols. Given two closed cards
dae , dbe as inputs, the former protocol outputs da + be , and the latter outputs dabe . Because
any function over F3 can be expressed using additions and multiplications, we can securely
compute any function over F3 by combining these protocols.
5.1 Addition protocol
The protocol proceeds as follows:



























1 We note that the j-th boy such that cj = 1 can maliciously announce the i-th girl such that i 6= bj , and
this is not noticed when the i-th girl is attracted to the j-th boy. Thus, the levels of trust between boys
and girls are different. To avoid this asymmetry of boys and girls, we can use one additional card. That
is, by using an additional card, we can copy the input of each boy and verify the girl they have in mind.
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Table 2 All possibilities of the final sequence in our addition protocol.
(a, b) a + b s0 s1 s2
(0, 0) 0 (0, 0) (1, 1) (2, 2)
(0, 1) 1 (0, 1) (1, 2) (2, 0)
(0, 2) 2 (0, 2) (1, 0) (2, 1)
(1, 0) 1 (2, 0) (0, 1) (1, 2)
(1, 1) 2 (2, 1) (0, 2) (1, 0)
(1, 2) 0 (2, 2) (0, 0) (1, 1)
(2, 0) 2 (1, 0) (2, 1) (0, 2)
(2, 1) 0 (1, 1) (2, 2) (0, 0)
(2, 2) 1 (1, 2) (2, 0) (0, 1)









After applying a rotation shuffle to the sequence (d−ae , dbe) in Step 3, the resulting sequence
is one of s0, s1, s2 as follows:
s0 = (d−ae , dbe),
s1 = (d−a + 1e , db + 1e),
s2 = (d−a + 2e , db + 2e).
Table 2 shows all possibilities of the final sequence in our addition protocol. We can observe
that in each sequence, the right value is a + b + `, where ` is the left value. Therefore, our
addition protocol is correct.
5.1.2 Security
Let v be the opened value in Step 4. Owing to the rotation shuffle in Step 3, v is equal
to −a + r, where r ∈ F3 is a uniformly random value that is hidden from all parties and
independent from the inputs (a, b). Thus, the distribution of v and the distribution of the
inputs are statistically independent.
5.2 Multiplication protocol
The protocol proceeds as follows:
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Table 3 All possibilities of the final sequence in our multiplication protocol. (An underlined
value corresponds to the output.)
(a, b) ab s0 s1 s2
(0, 0) 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 0, 2)
(0, 1) 0 (0, 0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 0, 2) (0, 0, 0, 0)
(0, 2) 0 (0, 0, 0, 2) (0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 1)
(1, 0) 0 (0, 2, 1, 0) (1, 2, 0, 1) (2, 0, 1, 2)
(1, 1) 1 (0, 2, 1, 1) (2, 1, 0, 2) (1, 0, 2, 0)
(1, 2) 2 (0, 2, 1, 2) (2, 1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 2, 1)
(2, 0) 0 (0, 1, 2, 0) (1, 2, 0, 1) (2, 0, 1, 2)
(2, 1) 2 (0, 1, 2, 1) (1, 2, 0, 2) (2, 0, 1, 0)
(2, 2) 1 (0, 1, 2, 2) (1, 2, 0, 0) (2, 0, 1, 1)




















→4© 4© 4© 4© .
5. Open the fourth card. Then, the closed card dabe is obtained as follows:
4©
dabe
4© 4© 4♠ or 4© 4© 4©
dabe




After applying a flower shuffle to the sequence (d0e , d−ae , dae , dbe) in Step 4, the resulting
sequence is one of s0, s1, s2 as follows:
s0 = (d0e , d−ae , dae , dbe),
s1 = (d−ae , dae , d0e , db + 1e),
s2 = (dae , d0e , d−ae , db + 2e).
Table 3 shows all the possibilities of the final sequence in our multiplication protocol. We can
observe that in each sequence, the underlying value is equal to ab, and the first/second/third
value is underlined if the fourth value is 0/2/1, respectively. Therefore, our multiplication
protocol is correct.
5.2.2 Security
Let v1, v2 be the opened values in Steps 2 and 5, respectively. From Section 5.1.2, v1 is
statistically independent from the inputs. Owing to the flower shuffle in Step 4, v2 is equal
to b + r, where r ∈ F3 is a uniformly random value that is hidden from all parties and
independent from v1 and the inputs (a, b). Thus, the distribution of the opened values and
the distribution of the inputs are statistically independent.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed novel cards called triangle cards, and solved the secure (3, 3)-
matching problem using six triangle cards. We also designed a protocol for any function over
F3. One could ask if our technique applies to Fn for any n. A straightforward generalization
to this case does not work. This is because for a regular n-sided polygon with n > 3, a
rotation over n − 1 points with a single fixed point cannot be implemented by a physical
operation. In contrast, in the triangle case a turning operation corresponds to an operation
of this type: a rotation between 1 and 2 with a fixed point 0. Our protocols exploits this
property. This is why we concentrate on a triangle rather than a general polygon. An
interesting open question is that of finding new physical objects that enable the construction
of an efficient protocol for the secure (n, m)-matching problem for any integers n, m.
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Figure 1 Triangle cards: an opened card (left) and a closed card (right).
Figure 2 A rotation shuffle. Figure 3 A turning shuffle. Figure 4 A flower shuffle.
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A Implementation of cards and shuffles
Figure 1 shows an example implementation of a triangle card. The left card is an opened
card, and the right card is a closed card. A rotation shuffle is implemented by using
three clips: all cards are stacked using three clips as in Figure 2, and then the stack is
spun like a “roulette wheel.” A turning shuffle is implemented by using a single clip: all
cards are stacked using a clip as in Figure 3, and then the stack is thrown in a spinning
manner, like a coin toss (this technique is called a spinning throw [8]). A flower shuffle for
(dx0e , dx1e , dx2e , dy1e , · · · , dyne) is implemented by using three clips: As in Figure 4, the
last n cards dy1e , · · · , dyne are stacked and placed on the center of the flower, dx0e is placed
on the top petal, dx1e is placed on the right petal, and dx2e is placed on the left petal.
Then, the flower is spun like a “roulette wheel.”
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